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1. INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the proceedings of the inaugural
workshop on Designing Interactive Secure Systems
(DISS 2012). This workshop was held in conjunction
with the 26th BCS Interaction Specialist Group
Conference on People and Computers at the
University of Birmingham on September 11th 2012.
In recent years, the field of usable security has
attracted researchers from HCI and Information
Security, and led to a better understanding of
the interplay between human factors and security
mechanisms. Despite these advances, designing
systems which are both secure in, and appropriate
for, their contexts of use continues to frustrate
both researchers and practitioners. One reason is
a misunderstanding of the role that HCI can play in
the design of secure systems. A number of eminent
security researchers and practitioners continue to
espouse the need to treat people as the weakest
link, and encourage designers to build systems that
Homer Simpson can use. Unfortunately, treating
users as a problem can limit the opportunities for
innovation when people are engaged as part of a
solution. Similarly, while extreme characters (such as
Homer) can be useful for envisaging different modes
of interaction, when taken out of context they risk
disenfranchising the very people the design is meant
to support.
Better understanding the relationship between
human factors and the design of secure systems
is an important step forward, but many design
research challenges still remain. There is growing
evidence that HCI design artefacts can be effective
at supporting secure system design, and that some
alignment exists between HCI, security, and software
engineering activities. However, more is needed to
understand how broader insights from the interactive
system design and user experience communities
might also find traction in secure design practice. For
these insights to lead to design practice innovation,
we also need usability and security evaluation
activities that better support interaction design,
together with software tools that augment, rather
than hinder, these design processes. Last, but not
least, we need to share experiences and anecdotes
about designing usable and secure systems, and
reflect on the different ways of performing and
evaluating secure interaction design research.
The objective of this workshop was to act as a
forum for those interested in the design of interactive
secure systems. By bringing together a like-minded
community of researchers and practitioners, we
aimed to share knowledge gleaned from recent
research, as well as experiences designing secure
and usable systems in practice. In doing so,
this workshop became a crucible for building an
interactive secure system design community, and
forming collaborative partnerships to progress many
of the aforementioned challenges.
Although this was the inaugural edition of this
particular workshop, it built on the success of recent
workshops in usable security at BCS HCI 2010 and
BCS HCI 2011. This workshop also drew on the
need highlighted at last year’s NIST sponsored event
on Security and Usable Security Aligned for Good
Engineering for building bridges between different
design disciplines, and providing a forum for sharing
c© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
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anecdotal experiences about the design of usable
and secure systems.
The aim of British HCI 2012 was to return to
the conference’s founding theme of People and
Computers. Like the HCI field in general, the growing
diversity of work in HCI-Security and Interactive
System Design made the running of this workshop
a timely opportunity to return to the design problems
that motivated early work in these areas.
2. TECHNICAL PROGRAMME
In our call for papers, we invited 4-page position
papers that would provoke discussion about the
design of interactive secure systems. Our suggested
list of topics included design techniques for
socio-technical systems, technology for supporting
interactive secure system design, usable and secure
system evaluation, and experience reports.
The review process for each submission was
rigorous. To select the technical programme, we
were fortunate to be able to draw upon a panel
of international experts; their expertise spanned
the spectrum of interactive secure system design,
from arts/design through to security engineering.
Each paper submission received at least three
reviews, although the vast majority received four.
In addition to assessing the quality of work,
reviewers were also asked to highlight areas they
felt would provoke interesting discussion during the
workshop itself. As such, these proceedings not only
represent the efforts of the paper authors, but also
the reviewers who provided detailed reviews and
insightful suggestions to make sure authors get the
most out of the DISS workshop experience.
3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This workshop would not have been possible
without the hard work and dedication of our
programme committee and external reviewers who,
despite managing a slew of other commitments,
still managed to find time to provide timely, high
quality reviews to the paper authors. We are also
grateful to the paper authors for contributing their
work and participating in the workshop programme
itself. Finally, we would like to thank the organisers
of British HCI 2012 for hosting us, and the EU FP 7
webinos project for their sponsorship of this event.
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An effective authentication mechanism should embrace both security and usability aspects as its 
purpose is to provide maximum protection of application providers’ assets but as well usability 
and transparency to its end users, aiming to minimize cognitive overloads. With the aim to 
investigate the relation among users’ working memory capacity and different types of 
authentication mechanisms, a study was conducted which entailed a psychometric-based survey 
for identifying users’ working memory capacity, combined with a real usage scenario with two 
variations of authentication mechanisms. A total of 97 users participated in the reported study 
during a 5-month period providing interesting insights with respect to users’ working memory and 
preference and performance of authentication mechanisms. 
         Authentication Mechanism. Working Memory. Usability. Preference. Performance.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Research on authentication mechanisms has 
received significant attention lately with the 
aim to improve their usability and 
memorability, and at the same time decrease 
guessing attacks by malicious software and 
users (Inglesant and Sasse, 2010; Biddle et 
al., 2011). Researchers promote various 
designs of authentication mechanisms based 
on text and pictures, combinations of text and 
pictures, password managers and policies, 
etc. (Verma, 2012; Mihajlov and Jerman-
Blazic, 2011; Biddle et al., 2011). 
 
In this context, a large-scale study of half a 
million users, which investigated the password 
usage habits, supports the need of memorable 
and secure passwords (Florencio and Herley, 
2007). A more recent study by Inglesant and 
Sasse (2010) that investigated the impact of 
password policies on users’ productivity and 
experience, suggested that security policies 
should be driven by the users’ needs helping 
them to set a stronger password instead of 
focusing on maximizing password strength. 
 
Many shortcomings of authentication 
mechanisms arise from the limitations of 
human memory. The number of items the 
human brain can temporarily store is limited, 
with a short-term capacity (i.e., working 
memory) of ~3-7 items, depending on the task 
(Baddeley, 2007; Cowan, 2010). Enhanced 
working memory increases the connections 
and associations that can be built either 
between the items of the newly encountered 
information or between this information and 
information already stored in the long-term 
memory. Various research works (Cowan, 
2010; Baddeley, 2007) argue that working 
memory has an effect on mental tasks, such 
as information processing, comprehension, 
learning, and problem solving. 
 
Many studies indicate that working memory 
capacity varies among people and predicts 
individual differences in intellectual ability 
(Cowan, 2010; Baddeley, 2007). Such 
individual differences need to be further 
investigated aiming to understand whether 
they affect user interactions with 
authentication mechanisms. 
 
In light of these challenges, this paper 
presents results of an empirical study which 
investigated the effect of working memory 
capacity of users towards preference and 
performance issues of two different types of 
authentication mechanisms; password and 
graphical authentication mechanisms. 
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2. METHOD OF STUDY 
2.1 Procedure 
A Web-based psychometric instrument was 
developed that assesses the capacity of the 
visuo-spatial sketchpad of users, which is the 
temporary storage mechanism responsible for 
processing visual and spatial information 
(Baddeley, 2007). This instrument aims to 
measure the amount of information the visuo-
spatial sketchpad of a person can efficiently 
activate simultaneously by requesting from 
that person to memorize an abstract image 
and then compare that image with five other 
similar images. 
 
Furthermore, a Web-based environment was 
developed for two introductory Computer 
Science university courses. Students were 
required to provide their demographic 
information during the enrolment process (i.e., 
email, age, gender, and department), and 
create their authentication key that was used 
for accessing the courses’ material (i.e., 
course slides, homework exercises) and for 
viewing their grades. The type of 
authentication (password or graphical 
mechanism) was randomly provided during the 
enrolment process. At the end of the process 
the sample consisted of half of the students 
having enrolled with a password and the other 
half having enrolled with a graphical 
authentication mechanism. For the purpose of 
the experiment, in the middle of the semester, 
the system altered the students’ authentication 
type; students that had enrolled with a 
password during the first half of the semester 
were prompted to create a new graphical 
authentication key and vice versa. The new 
authentication key would be used during the 
second half of the semester. The main aim of 
this process was to capture the interaction 
data of users for both types of authentication 
throughout the semester and further elicit their 
preference towards a particular type. 
 
The password mechanism involved 
alphanumeric and special keyboard 
characters. A minimum of 6 characters 
including numbers, a mixture of lower- and 
upper-case letters, and special characters 
were required to be entered by the users. The 
graphical authentication mechanism involved 
single-object pictures with one-time 
authentication codes, where users had to 
select a minimum of 6 pictures (out of 30 
available pictures) in a specific sequence, and 
was based on the recognition-based, graphical 
authentication mechanism proposed by 
Mihajlov and Jerman-Blazic (2011). 
 
The total time required for successful 
authentication was monitored on the client-
side utilizing a browser-based logging facility 
that started recording time as soon users 
entered the authentication Web-page, until 
they successfully completed the authentication 
process. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
The following null hypotheses were 
formulated: i) working memory capacity of 
users does not have a significant effect on 
users’ preference towards password 
mechanisms or recognition-based, graphical 
authentication mechanisms, ii) there is no 
significant difference with regards to time 
needed to authenticate through a password 
mechanism or a recognition-based, graphical 
authentication mechanism among users 
having low, medium, and high working 
memory capacity. 
2.3 Demographics of Participants 
A total of 97 people participated in the study 
between January and May 2012. Participants 
varied from the age of 17 to 24, with a mean 
age of 20 and were undergraduate students of 
Electrical Engineering, Psychology and Social 
Science Departments. A total of 3461 
successful authentications have been 
recorded during the 5 month period. 
3. RESULTS 
For our analysis, we separated the participants 
in three categories based on their working 
memory capacity: Low (N=27, f=27.8%, 33.37 
average logins/user), Medium (N=50, f=51.5%, 
38.88 average logins/user), and High (N=20, 
f=20.6%, 30.8 average logins/user).  
3.1 Preference of User Authentication 
An online questionnaire was provided to the 
students at the end of the study to express 
their preference towards a specific type of 
authentication (i.e., password or graphical). 66 
out of the 97 students completed the 
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authentication mechanisms, as users 
belonging to the Low working memory group 
preferred graphical authentication 
mechanisms. In contrast, in the case of users 
that belong to the Medium and High working 
memory groups, no significant difference in 
preference and performance was observed 
between the two variations.   
 
Taking into consideration that a graphical 
authentication mechanism is from a user’s 
point of view a less demanding cognitive task 
than a password (recognition vs. recall of 
information), an interpretation of this result can 
be based on the fact that graphical 
authentication mechanisms leverage human 
memory for visual information (Biddle et al., 
2011) and thus users with decreased working 
memory (i.e., Low) find graphical 
authentication mechanisms more usable and 
memorable since passwords are more 
demanding from a memory retrieval point of 
view. Another interpretation of this result can 
be based on the fact that users’ preference 
towards graphical authentication might have 
also been affected by the picture superiority 
effect (Paivio and Csapo, 1973). On the other 
hand, users with enhanced working memory 
capacity could handle both authentication 
mechanisms more efficiently and effectively, 
hence no significant preference and 
performance were reported between the two 
types. 
 
The limitations of the reported study are 
related to the fact that the participants were 
undergraduate students with an age between 
17 to 24 years. Furthermore, carrying out a 
single assessment of users’ working memory 
might not fully justify the users’ classification 
into specific working memory groups. In this 
respect, further tests need to be conducted in 
order to reach more concrete conclusions. On 
the other hand, there has been an effort to 
increase ecological validity of the research 
since the participants were involved in real 
tasks, in their own physical environment, and 
without the intervention of any experimental 
equipment or observer.  
 
Future research prospects include further 
investigating the effect of individual differences 
of users on preference and performance 
issues in security-related interactions (Belk et 
al., 2012). The overarching aim is to drive this 
research towards the development of a user-
centred adaptation framework that will provide 
personalized security interactions based on 
cognitive factors of users. 
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This paper reports on the challenge of designing an application for bootstrapping secure communications in
ad-hoc situations. The starting point of this work was based on prior work in “spontaneous security”: making
use of Human-Interactive Security Protocols (HISPs) which exploit a human-based unspoofable channel to
bootstrap secure comunications. Our approach was to develop a realistic scenario in which spontaneous and
secure communications are necessary, and to use this to drive the development of the application. We settled
on exploring how to provide secure communications in disasters: situations where existing communication
and security infrastructures may be unavailable. Using the disaster scenario to guide development, we
implemented a mobile application which allows users to create ad-hoc WiFi networks and bootstrap secure
communications over these networks.
Disaster, Spontaneous security, Human-Interactive Security Protocol
1. INTRODUCTION
Current security architectures are often rigid and
unable to support situations where requirements are
hard to identify upfront, or situations where flexibility
is essential. Much of the domain of computer security
is based on networks of shared secrets, or relies on
certification structures and public key cryptography.
It is notoriously difficult to make such structures
dynamic, not least because the decisions about how
parties are accredited and connections made are
fixed by the designers of systems rather than those
using them. Likewise, infrastructures like PKIs bind
names to public keys, curtailing the possibility of
naming flexibility. In response to these shortcomings,
efforts have been made over the past 10 years to
develop spontaneous security ; one key aspect of
this research has been the development of Human-
Interactive Security Protocols (HISPs).
HISPs are protocols for authenticating systems and
exchanging encryption keys based on the compar-
ison of short strings over an empirical channel : an
unspoofable human-based communication channel
(Roscoe and Nguyen 2006). These protocols use a
combination of digital communication channels and
the empirical channel to bootstrap secure communi-
cations using knowledge that a human can only have
gained via direct interaction with the system. The
security of these protocols has been proven through
formal evaluation; however, given the central role of a
human agent in their correct use, the specific design
and usability of their implementation is critical.
In order to design an application demonstrating the
capabilities of HISPs and spontaneous security, we
decided to use a realistic scenario as a means
of exploring the problem domain. To represent the
need for flexibility and security, we focussed on the
challenges of communication in a disaster situation.
Disasters, like the Japanese tsunami of 2011, can
destroy communication infrastructures as well as
security infrastructures. In such events, establishing
communications is a vital and time-critical job –
one which cannot ignore the importance of security.
Rescue operations often require cooperation among
forces from different sectors, e.g. police forces,
rescue teams, the military, as well as civilians.
Security is necessary to guarantee the integrity,
confidentiality and availability of communication
channels in these operations, however it cannot
be specified upfront. It is for these reasons that
we decided to focus on this exemplar as a means
of designing our application and showcasing the
possibilities offered by spontaneous security.
In the following sections, we provide a brief overview
of the security protocols that we use, and present
our application – discussing the role of the disaster
scenario in making specific design decisions.
2. SPONTANEOUS SECURITY
Spontaneous security aims to support users to
decide ad-hoc on what systems can communicate
with each other with no need for pre-existing
© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
Proceedings of BCS HCI 2012 Workshops
Designing Interactive Secure Systems
Secure Communication in Disasters
Chen, Flechais, Creese, Goldsmith and Roscoe
structures or infrastructures of encryption keys.
A central means of achieving this is based
on the discovery of highly efficient protocols
for authenticating systems and exchanging keys,
through the comparison of short strings generated
by the parties involved.
A HISP allows two or more parties who trust one
another, or a single party who trusts one or more
others, to bootstrap a secure network using no more
than an ability to communicate a small number of bits
over an empirical channel. Another way of looking at
them is that if the people involved create an insecure
channel between their devices, and already have
an unfakeable way of passing a small amount of
information amongst them, then they can either turn
the insecure channel into a secure one or discover
the presence of an intruder who is trying to subvert
it. The unfakeability of the empirical channel might
arise from physical proximity (where participants can
see and talk to one another), or real-time unspoofable
interaction such as speaking on the phone.
The following describes the Symmetric HCBK
protocol (SHCBK) (Roscoe and Nguyen 2008); a
typical group HISP which can secure an arbitrarily-
sized group.
1. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : A, INFOA, hash(A, hkA)
2. ∀A −→N ∀A′ : hkA
3. users compare digest(hk∗, {INFO′A|A ∈ G}),
where hk∗ is the XOR of all hkA’s for A ∈ G
Where −→N represents a high bandwidth channel
subject to the Dolev–Yao attack model (Dolev and
Yao 1983), SHCBK has each node “publish” its name
and a collection of information that it wishes to bind
to that name. It also sends a hash1 of a randomly
generated key hkA coupled with the name.
Once a node has received that information from all
the others – and therefore become committed to
the set of identities, INFO and hashed keys – it
publishes its previously secret hkA. The point is that
by the time of this last publication, it is committed
to all the data used in the above protocol, even
though it does not yet know all the hkAs. A careful
security analysis of this protocol (see (Roscoe and
Nguyen 2008), for example) demonstrates that any
attacker is unable to profit from combinatorial analysis
aimed at getting the check-strings (i.e. digests) to
agree even though nodes have different views of
the authenticated information. Good HISPs such as
SHCBK therefore offer maximum security for a given
amount of human effort.
1Hash means a standard cryptographic hash function that has two
main properties: collision resistance, and inversion resistance.
The digest function (Roscoe and Nguyen 2006, 2008)
is designed so that, as hk varies, the probability that
digest(hk,X) = digest(hk, Y ) for X 6= Y is less than
ε, where typically ε is very close to the theoretically
optimal value of 2−b for b the number of bits in the
output of digest. It must also have the property that for
any fixed value d, the chance that digest(hk,X) = d
as hk varies is less than ε also. More details of this
protocol can be found in (Chen et al. 2012).
As an example, Alice and Bob want to create a secure
connection between their mobile devices. First they
connect their devices using a normal channel (e.g.
Bluetooth, WiFi), and we assume this connection
is initially insecure. Alice and Bob then run the
protocol which generates a check-string (e.g. a six-
digit number) and exchange this value. One method
of exchanging the value is for Alice to read the check-
string and Bob to type it on his own mobile device.
Another is for them to both read it, compare the one
heard with the check-string displayed on their own
devices, and confirm that it indeed matches.
Because Alice and Bob are in physical proximity, they
can make sure that no one can fake this check-string.
The communication channel they use to exchange
the check-string is an empirical channel: no one can
alter the check-string and no one can fake the origin
of the check-string. The check-string is then used
to test the presence of the attacker. For example, if
the check-string entered matches the one generated
by their own devices, they can be confident that the
connection has been secured; otherwise, it is likely
that the connection is insecure and an attacker (e.g.
a man-in-the-middle attacker) is in presence.
3. HISP APPLICATION
Based on the disaster scenario, we assume that
people will have their own mobile devices to
communicate, and have designed our application
accordingly. The connection between devices uses
the peer-to-peer (ad hoc) WiFi mode. This allows
the creation of a communication network for
situations where the existing infrastructure may be
unavailable. To secure communications over this
network we break down the application into three
steps: group formation, running the protocol, and
ongoing communication.
To simplify our discussion, an important assumption
has to be made before bootstrapping security for a
group: members of a group are capable of verifying
the legitimacy of every other member of the group.
3.1. Group formation
Formally, bootstrapping a group can be defined as
follows: all members acknowledge a list L, which
2
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contains details of all members; the resulting group
G contains exactly the same number of members
recorded in L and no one, except for the members
included in L, can be allowed to join G. To satisfy this
task, we need to identify and overcome the following
challenges: collecting members’ information and
counting the number of members.
In GAnGs (Chen et al. 2008) the authors present two
solutions for collecting group members’ information
when they are in the same room. The first solution is
to use an untrusted projector as a central node by
displaying its Bluetooth address as a 2D barcode.
All members connect their mobile phones to the
projector by reading this barcode and send their
details to the projector which then broadcasts the
list L to the group; whilst this is fairly simple, it is
not suitable for the disaster scenario. The second
solution is to create a tree structure to collect
members’ information one by one by reading 2D
barcodes of Bluetooth addresses. This can be a
laborious process which involves a large amount of
human effort (e.g. 30 human interactions for a group
of ten members).
Our solution is tailored to WiFi, where one device
(the Initiator) can broadcast2 messages include
its IP address and profile. Other devices within
communication range can pick up these messages
and display the Initiator’s profile. The user can then
choose whether or not to join this group.
The second step is to count group members –
verifying that the size of the group G matches the
size of listL. This is to prevent an insider from creating
multiple fake identities and passing the authentication
step. For example, when comparing digests, an
insider can compare digests multiple times and fake
the presence of the identities he/she has created.
When a group is small (e.g. 3 or 4 members),
counting is straightforward. However, as the size of
the group grows, so does the likelihood of mistakes.
For example, in a group of over 100 members, it is
unreasonable to expect all members to count the
whole group consistently and individually. One simple
solution is to utilise “crowd-knowledge" to remove
illegal members from list L. Another is to divide a
large group into small groups, and create a strategy
for merging the smaller groups into a larger one.
In our application, we assume that the Initiator
manages the counting on behalf of others. This
means that the Initiator knows how many members
are in the group and he/she can remove illegal
identities.
2This can be achieved by sending UDP packets to the broadcast
address. The broadcast address is computed by the following
equation: Broadcast address = IP address | ~Netmask.
Figure 1: Screen shots (left to right, top to bottom): (i) join
a group; (ii) start the protocol; (iii) display the digest; (iv)
enter the digest; (v) send a text message; (vi) send a voice
message.
3.2. Running the protocol
Since the Initiator manages the group formation, they
are also responsible for starting the HISP. When
the protocol starts, devices broadcast Message One:
A, INFOA, hash(A, hkA). At this stage, each device
must ensure that it has received exactly N unique
copies of Message One, where N equals to the size
of the group. This is critical to guarantee that all
members are committed to hkAs.
A device must not process other messages until it
has received all N copies of Message One. This will
guarantee the failure of this stage will be detected in
the digest comparison stage.
When all devices have received all Message Ones,
they start to broadcast Message Two: hkA. Similar to
the previous stage, all devices need to make sure they
have received all N copies of Message Two. Once
they have, they compute and display the digest value.
The digest comparison stage serves to check
whether there is any mistake or attacker in
the previous two stages of communication. To
symmetrically compare digests in a group of size
N (N > 2), a total number of N(N − 1)/2 two
way interactions, or N(N − 1) one way interactions
(for example, taking photos of 2D barcodes), have
to be made. Given N = 8, there can be 28 to 56
interactions. In order to improve usability, we must
reduce the number of human interactions involved in
this stage.
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Figure 2: Devices running the secure communication
application.
In our application, we have assumed that there is
one trustworthy member who is known by the rest of
the group, and all members are close to each other
so they can hear each other speaking. We further
assume that the trustworthy member is the Initiator.
The Initiator reads out the digest to the group
members who enter this value into their own devices
(manually entering the digest has already been
shown to be both usable and secure (R. Kainda and
Roscoe 2009)). The device then checks that the value
entered matches with its own version. When this is
completed, all members raise their hands to indicate
that the digest comparison is successful; or speak
loudly if the digest comparison has failed. The Initiator
reading the digest to the rest of the group is a typical
one-to-many empirical channel. Since we assume
the Initiator is trustworthy, we have used this empirical
channel to improve usability; if we consider the step of
raising hand and checking as one single interaction,
the total number of interactions is reduced to 2N .
3.3. Communication: cooperation in disasters
After the protocol is successful, we use Diffie-
Hellman public keys (included in INFOA) to generate
shared symmetric keys and then we generate a
group key by using the symmetric keys. We have
implemented text messaging, voice messaging and
sending photos on the basis of a map function
(see Figure 2). We have also augmented text and
voice communication with location and photography
functions to facilitate rescue operations. The location
function can track a user’s location on the map; the
photo function is used to post notices on the map (e.g.
newly hazardous areas).
4. FUTURE RESEARCH
We have discussed basic issues of group formation
and comparison of digests. More needs to be
done to explore how to establish and maintain a
sufficiently large ad hoc group of devices using
the connection technology available in a given
scenario. For example, should a group be formed
using a single initiator, a tree structure, broadcasting
over a fully connected graph, or some other
topology? This question can be posed both for
initial network formation and for digest comparison
between humans. How should we manage group
amalgamation and splitting, or adding and removing
single members? We have also indicated that naming
is difficult in disasters, but how to manage identities
remains a significant challenge in disasters.
5. CONCLUSION
We have discussed how we designed and imple-
mented a secure communication application in a
disaster scenario. Our implementation shows that we
can optimise performance by designing and regulat-
ing the group formation and the digest comparison
process. It also shows that we can easily build vari-
ous communication functions on top of this security
platform to facilitate rescue operations in disasters.
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As systems become more complex, the potential for security vulnerabilities being introduced increases. If
we are to provide assurances about systems we design then we need the means of analysing, managing, and
generally making sense of the data that contributes to the design. Unfortunately, despite ongoing research
into tools for supporting secure software development, there are few examples of how tools can be used to
help build and support design models associated with security and usability. This paper summarises some
of our experiences developing and applying CAIRIS: a requirements management tool for usable and secure
system design. We describe our motivation for building CAIRIS, summarise how it was built and evaluated,
and present our experiences applying it to real world case studies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As systems become more complex, the potential for
security vulnerabilities being introduced increases.
This means that if we are to provide any assurances
about systems that we design then we need
some means for analysing, managing, and generally
making sense of all the data that contributes to a
system’s design to ensure such vulnerabilities are
not unintentionally introduced. While there has been
ongoing research into software tools to support the
development of secure software, there has been
comparatively little work on tools for reasoning about
security and usability models. Without this ability,
it is difficult to predict the usability implications
of security design decisions and vice-versa, the
security implications of usability decisions; this
becomes particularly difficult when considering how
these implications might change in different contexts
of use.
To help understand how software tools can
support security and usability design techniques,
we developed CAIRIS (Computer Aided Integration
of Requirements and Information Security): a
requirements management tool for secure and
usable system design. Since developing the initial
prototype in 2009, we have evolved CAIRIS based
on our experiences in several real-world case
studies. In this paper, we reflect on some of
these experiences building and applying CAIRIS.
In Section 2, we briefly describe some of the
challenges that motivated our approach to designing
CAIRIS, before summarising how the tool has been
developed and evaluated in Section 3. In Section 4,
we discuss some of our experiences and problems
faced in using and maintaining CAIRIS.
2. RELATED WORK
Because requirements are a recognised boundary
object across security, usability, and software en-
gineering models, requirements management tools
have been proposed as a basis for supporting se-
curity and usability design activities. Their potential
for extensibility is illustrated by the DOORS require-
ments management tool (IBM 2010) which, with the
aid of its DXL scripting language, supports exten-
sions for specifying positive and negative scenarios
of user behaviour(Alexander 2002). However, the
lack of distinct semantics for the underlying con-
cepts associated with these techniques means that
analysts need to manually maintain links between
requirements and non-requirements artifacts.
By structuring the data being managed according
to a specific meta-model, model-based approaches
c© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
Proceedings of BCS HCI 2012 Workshops
Designing Interactive Secure Systems
Software for Interactive Secure Systems Design: Lessons Learned Developing and Applying CAIRIS
Faily and Fléchais
address this traceability management problem.
However, modelling languages and tools tend
to consider requirements only as a notational
concept. For example, while UMLSec—a UML profile
for secure system development(Jürjens 2005)—
supports the concept of a security requirement, this
is depicted only as a UML stereotype. Rather than
being concerned with how these might be analysed,
the notation is concerned with the requirement’s
deployment rather than its specification.
Further problems arise when trying to integrate tools
grounded in similar, but subtly different, conceptual
models. For example, if we assert that a misuse
case threatens a use case, do we agree what
it means for the use case to be threatened?
Does the misuse case threaten the work carried
out by the use case, or the assets associated
with it? Houmb et. al (Houmb et al. 2010) faced
some of these problems when integrating tools
based on different techniques. Their experiences
indicate that while building heuristics into tools to
help with integration is useful, these alone can’t
replace the expertise needed to apply the techniques
themselves. Consequently, while integrating tools
and concepts can help verify requirements, few tools
provide support for eliciting or validating them.
3. BUILDING AND EVALUATING CAIRIS
Based both on the IRIS meta-model (Faily and
Fléchais 2010)—which characterised our ideas
about how concepts from requirements, security,
and usability engineering might interrelate—and
lessons learned from existing tools, we designed and
developed CAIRIS to appeal to the following design
principles:
• Familiarity: The tool itself should not add to pre-
existing cognitive burdens; given the difficulty
associated with grasping new concepts and
learning new notations, the tool and its artifacts
should require no more cognitive overhead
than learning how to use the techniques
associated with IRIS meta-model.
• Extensibility: Because the tool was to be used
in several case studies, new insights might
arise from its use; this could include identifying
unnecessary functions, or the need for new
functionality. Moreover, it should be possible
to quickly modify the tool to implement the
suggested changes and assess their impact
during, or shortly after, an intervention.
• Standardisation: As well as structuring the
collected data, we wanted the tool to be
used to support a variety of existing analysis
techniques. Crucially, we wanted to ensure
that the tool supported each without changing
standard concepts or the manner in which
each technique normally operated. This meant
that different people might use the tool to
support different techniques, according to their
expertise and responsibilities. Consequently,
given that the meta-model allowed data
collected through one technique to inform
another, traceability between model concepts
needed to be automatic.
We developed CAIRIS using a prototyping approach,
over five iterations.
In the first iteration, CAIRIS was developed in
parallel with the IRIS meta-model. The tool was used
to elicit data using contemporary examples where
multiple contexts of use were evident. One of these
examples involved analysing contemporary news
reports and documentation about the Vélib bicycle
sharing system to elicit security requirements which
would not compromise the usability of Vélib. The
objective of this phase was to determine whether the
concepts necessary to model the different problems
were reflected in the IRIS meta-model.
Based on early feedback from the Requirements
Engineering community (Faily and Fléchais 2009),
additional concepts were added to the IRIS meta-
model and the tool was evolved to support these. As
the meta-model became more elaborate, additional
model views were incorporated into the tool, and
the architecture was re-factored to allow scaleability
should further model elements and associations
need to be added.
In the second iteration, we created a specification
exemplar based on the NeuroGrid e-science project
(Geddes et al 2006) to validate whether the tool
was capable of modelling a complete, non-trivial
problem. Using CAIRIS, the resulting NeuroGrid
model was validated with one of the previous project
stakeholders.
The final three iterations involved applying CAIRIS
in three separate case studies; these studies are
described in more detail in (Faily 2011b)
CAIRIS was written primarily in Python, and used
the open-source wxPython and pyGTK frameworks
for windowing and visualisation support, and NumPy
for matrix manipulation. MySQL was used for
management and access to model data. Although
CAIRIS is primarily maintained by members of the
Security research group at the University of Oxford,
it has been released to github as an open-source
project under an Apache Software license.
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4. EXPERIENCES
Space constraints mean we are unable to reflect on
all of our experiences with CAIRIS. We do, however,
highlight three particular experiences that, we
believe, might provide useful insights to designers of
future software tools for secure and usable system
design.
4.1. Building on similarities rather than
differences
One of the first challenges we needed to address
was reconciling the several different security
requirements engineering meta-models that had
previously been proposed; this would be particularly
challenging given the lack of consensus about
what a security requirement is, e.g. (Tøndel et al.
2008). Rather than trying to tease out lessons
learned from all these models, we instead decided
to select a particular model and attempt to scale this
given the additional usability elements we wanted
to consider. We chose the Information Systems
Security Risk Management (ISSRM) modelling
language Mayer (2009) because not only was it
largely orthogonal to usability, it also attempted to
align with goal-oriented requirements languages.
While the concepts associated with those languages
were incompatible with IRIS, we believe that on-
going research in both CAIRIS and their languages
might lead to synergies in the future.
Our approach came at the cost of simplifying the
risk analysis approach adopted by ISSRM. This
ruled out the ability for modelling sophisticated
risk analysis strategies, such as blended threats
where an attacker might exploit two seemingly
innocuous vulnerabilities to achieve catastrophic
results. Nonetheless, by keeping the IRIS meta-
model as simple as possible without compromising
any of the fundamental concepts, we were able to
progressively incorporate concepts over time.
For example, based on what was originally an
unconnected research finding about the usefulness
of argumentation models for supporting persona
development Faily and Fléchais (2011), we were
eventually able to align concepts from IRIS with
what were incompatible goal-oriented requirements
techniques; this is described in more detail in
Faily (2011a). We believe that the success of this
approach relied not on seeing how social-goal
models could be built into CAIRIS, but on how
CAIRIS could add value to complementary tools
which are better suited to analysing these in more
detail.
4.2. Specifying contexts of use
From the outset, the concept of an environment was
supported in CAIRIS; this was introduced to make it
possible to specify and reason about the elements of
several different contexts of use for a given system.
However, based on the results of our case studies,
the results of trying to specify formal contexts of use
were mixed.
While environments could be of any type, those
of most value tended to be social or cultural
rather than physical. When considering one example
based on the NeuroGrid exemplar, we noticed
that security properties associated with certain
assets had markedly different security properties in
different environments. In the three case studies, the
security properties varied less, and the environments
were used to compartmentalise the analysis of
activities according to the context of most relevance.
Occasionally, however, some discussion arose by
comparing the same tasks carried out in different
social contexts, or discussing how the tasks carried
out in one environment had an impact in others.
We were also interested in how variations of context
could be composed to introduce new contexts
of use. Individually, such environments might be
innocuous but, when combined, new phenomena
might be observed that might not otherwise be
seen in the separate models. To investigate this,
CAIRIS allowed composition of an environment
based on one or more other environments. In
practice, however, this did not prove to be very
useful. Although the environments modelled in the
case study examples were non-trivial, they were
also distinct enough that combining them added little
value to the analysis carried out. However, reasoning
about dependencies between two environments was
occasionally useful when considering how attackers
might exploit knowledge about one environmental
context to cause a shift from one environment to
another, or how a risk in one context lead to a
subsequent risk being introduced in another.
4.3. Using CAIRIS
CAIRIS was not designed to be a general purpose
tool. One of the initial motivations for building the
tool was to support participative workshops where
stakeholders could discuss different models, and
examine the impact of model changes in real time.
However, when CAIRIS was used for supporting
design activities for the EU FP 7 webinos project,
we faced two new challenges. First, many of the
CAIRIS users didn’t have the necessary technical
background to install and setup CAIRIS. Second,
the users were only knowledgeable in some of the
capabilities of CAIRIS. As a result, of the users
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that did install and use CAIRIS, all used CAIRIS for
little more than a tool for specifying and managing
personas.
Because there was little time available on the project
to run training sessions, we used the project wiki to
capture structured data that could then be imported
into CAIRIS. We created structured page templates
for design artifacts like scenarios, use cases, and
personas. We then created scripts that could be
used to convert this content into compatible XML
models that could be imported into CAIRIS. In
addition to this, we provided guidance and support
for the rest of the project on the use of the templates.
Eventually, this approach was extended to security
and requirements models as well. As a result,
although the wiki was still used to browse data, most
of the webinos security, usability, and requirements
model was stored as text in a project git repository,
with a build script used to create a consolidated
CAIRIS model on demand. More details about this
process can be found in Faily et al. (2012).
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described some of our experiences
in designing, building, and using the CAIRIS
requirements management tool. In providing our
candid experiences with CAIRIS, we aim to begin
filling the hitherto unnoticed gap in the literature on
tools for secure and usable system design.
While the tool was designed to support only a
single researcher (the main author), the CAIRIS
user community is slowly beginning to grow.
Following the introduction of the tool to the
Oxford Software Engineering Programme’s Design
for Security course, practitioners are beginning to
use CAIRIS to address their own security design
challenges. As industrial take-up grows, we plan to
evaluate how well CAIRIS, and software tools in
general, tackle the security usability design problems
practitioners currently face.
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Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression (VOME) was a research project with the main 
objective of developing methods of expressing a wide range of on-line privacy-related concepts. 
Having built this wider vocabulary, VOME was also tasked with developing a range of privacy 
awareness interventions for both on and off-line contexts. Examples of VOME interventions include 
a card trading game, participatory video and embedded on-line interaction tools. In order to develop 
these interventions, VOME conducted a range of user-centric and participatory design engagements 
in communities across the UK. Engagements included: think-out-loud technology evaluations, 
participatory video development, “show and tell” family workshops, participatory theatre and 
community art collage building.  Within each of these engagements, the project used qualitative 
social research to ground the design of its interventions.  The communities in which VOME 
engaged represented a broad range of social and economic demographics and demonstrated 
varying levels of digital literacy. During its three and half years of engagement, VOME built up a 
rich set of lessons learned from using such a wide range of engagement approaches. The lessons 
learned address a number of key topics:  tension of engagement control between participants and 
researchers, importance of appropriately situating the engagement and limitation of participant 
segmentation. This short paper outlines VOME’s key findings within each of these topics.  
 
Key words: Engagement, intervention, digital literacy, privacy awareness. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression 
(VOME) is an interdisciplinary project that focuses 
on questions related to privacy, identity and 
consent in on-line services. The research is used to 
ground the development of technology designed to 
support privacy and consent decision-making. 
Examples of VOME interventions include a card 
trading game, participatory video and embedded 
on-line interaction tools, for example interactive 
information flow maps. From the start, VOME set 
out to engage with citizens who, to date, had not 
been included in privacy design studies. 
Sunderland City Council gives the example of one 
such group of citizens: 
“Consider the case of a young person, aged 13 
years, who is at risk of offending. They are one 
of the target groups for the Empowering Young 
People programme which will use on-line service 
delivery as part of the method of delivery. Some 
of their peers have heard about the scheme and 
are saying it will be used by the police to keep 
track of them. Our young person is shy, 
reserved and has some learning difficulties. How 
will they express their concerns about how their 
data will be used, or will they simply choose not 
to engage? How might this be further 
complicated if the young person were to be a 
member of a minority ethnic group? Would a set 
of tools designed for youth work support workers 
help clarify the issue, and engage the young 
person? How might the youngster explain how 
the scheme safeguards information rights to 
their peers?” Conn Crawford, Sunderland City 
Council.  
	  
The project teams conducted a number of 
qualitative social research studies that required 
researchers to explore how participants engage 
with technology and the decision-making logic in 
operation when personal information is disclosed.  
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The research teams realised quite quickly that 
traditional qualitative methods had limitations with 
the groups with which the project wanted to 
engage. In particular, researchers learned that 
unintentionally the traditional data gathering and 
engagement approaches were not inclusive and 
partially or completely excluded those with lower 
levels of digital and visual literacy and those with 
lower levels of social confidence. For example, our 
mixed method studies which used light 
technological evaluation, observations, interviews 
and surveys also proved challenging for those with 
lower levels of digital and visual literacy (Coles-
Kemp and Zabihi, 2011). This realisation both 
influenced the research approaches taken and 
method and media for data gathering.  
2. APPROACH 
In VOME, the traditional approaches found in 
security and privacy technology design were 
supplemented with more inclusive data gathering 
approaches. These approaches include: think-out-
loud technology evaluations, participatory video 
development, “show and tell” family workshops, 
participatory theatre and community art collage 
building. Using these approaches also taught the 
researchers about the need to cede control to 
participants and carefully segment communities 
into different constituencies. These approaches 
also clearly showed the need to design culturally 
sympathetic research approaches and to carefully 
select the media for data collection. 
2.1 Participatory Video 
VOME supported Hudson’s Youth Project in the 
London borough of Newham to produce two videos 
– one a documentary video that the VOME project 
specifically commissioned and the other a music 
video that the young people asked if they could 
make.  The aim was to create a participatory video 
where the young people determined what was 
filmed, how it was produced and, most importantly, 
the message conveyed. With the documentary 
video researchers were part of the focus groups 
that were run to stimulate discussion and the 
ensuing video displays strong characteristics of 
researcher involvement.  The music video on the 
other hand required no input at all from the 
researchers and used a medium that the young 
people were more comfortable with. The music 
video,  ‘Internet Saint, or Online Demon?’,  was a 
more effective approach for gathering young 
people’s views as it was made without intervention 
from researchers. This result showed that the 
design approach needs to use a medium for data 
gathering that is culturally sympathetic to the target 
demographic.  
 
2.2 Think-Out-Loud Technology Evaluations 
VOME used think-out-loud technology evaluations 
to better understand the logic behind personal 
information disclosure in different situations. For 
example, researchers developed an on-line 
registration prototype which represents a mock-up 
council, named Your Local Council (YLC), which 
offers an on-line smartcard registration service. 
This is a situation that many of the participants 
were familiar with and was situated in a relationship 
with an institution that many of them had. In the 
research activity, after the introduction to smartcard 
services provided by YLC, users were asked to 
interact with the website which guides them 
through a sequential registration process that 
consisted of the following pages: 
(i) Introduction to smartcard services and 
selection of services - The user starts by 
selecting one or more services. 
(ii) About us  
(iii) Personal Information Requirement - The 
service provider informs the user that 
certain personal information is required to 
use the service, what will happen to the 
data as well as the reason for collecting it. 
This information will be communicated to 
the user with help of an interactive dataflow 
diagram that displays who has access to 
what type of personal information. 
(iv) Service Agreement - The service provider 
gives a contract of their agreement with the 
user to keep as a reference. It is an 
overview of selected services, privacy 
policy and terms & condition. 
(v) Registration - The final step of the process 
is a registration page that displays a form 
where the user discloses the necessary 
personal information for acquiring the 
selected service(s). 
Participants were exposed to three privacy 
interventions during the registration process. 
Privacy awareness was measured using a mixed-
methods approach in three parts: 
• Questionnaire to categorise the participants 
in terms of their digital literacy. 
• Engagement with digital probes (YLC 
website) to encourage reflection (captured 
through think-out-loud) 
• Interview to evaluate levels of privacy 
awareness with the participant. 
2.3 “Show and Tell” Family Workshops 
One drawback to the think-out-loud technology 
evaluation in the previous section is that it 
constrained participants to reflect on a particular 
type of technology in a particular context. 
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As a result, VOME ran a number of “show and tell” 
workshops where a small group of participants, 
matching a particular set of criteria, would spend 
time showing and reflecting how they used ICT 
within the family setting and talking about the type 
of personal information that they disclosed in the 
process. In this approach, in contrast to the think-
out-loud technology evaluations, participants 
situate their technology use in a context to which 
they can relate. Participants also shape the flow of 
the engagement by bringing up points for 
discussion from the reflection sessions.  
 
One example of such a workshop took place in 
northern England in July 2011. The workshop 
involved six granddaughters (GDs) and six 
grandmothers (GMs). It was staged in the part of a 
northern English town where local 
granddaughter/grandmother pairs could be 
recruited through a community center. Preliminary 
work had already identified that there were close 
family pairings and internet active family members 
who met the criteria for participation.  
 
The GMs were aged 55+ and four of the six GMs 
were great-grandmothers. They included a mix of 
active social networkers and those without 
accounts for any social networks. One GM used 
social networking to keep contact with relatives in 
Australia. Two of the others used the Internet for 
email and on-line shopping. The non-social 
networkers all had experience of family members 
who use social networks. The event was facilitated 
by a community leader and a VOME researcher. 
The workshop began with an introduction to 
VOME’s research and the process for the day. This 
explained that VOME’s work is on personal 
information control, but didn’t develop the theme. 
The “show and tell” session in this instance used 
GMs and GDs in a pair.  Each GD/GM pair used 
the big screen and the computer in the workshop 
room to show their activities. The participant group 
was then encouraged to discuss issues that arose 
and write down thoughts and reflections. The 
follow-on “show and tell” session picked up on the 
themes identified in the reflection session. 
2.4 Participatory Theatre and Community Art 
Whilst “show and tell” family workshops moved 
VOME researchers some way towards participant-
led situated research, researcher intervention was 
still present and for some participants that 
presence was a barrier to engagement with the 
research. As a result, VOME pushed further 
towards participant-led research engagements by 
using participatory theatre and community collage 
making. This form of engagement would often 
involve collaboration with performance artists, in 
particular clowns, who initiate engagement with 
members of the public and introduce them to some 
very simple research tasks.  
 
One example of this is collage building in 
Middlesbrough Railway Station. The focus of this 
activity was to ask members of the public what type 
of secrets they keep on-line and what secrets they 
try to find out on-line. Performance artists initially 
engaged with participants. Those who then wanted 
to answer research questions were invited to 
produce some drawings, text or sound recordings 
for a collage that was built in the underpass of 
Middlesbrough railway station. The same approach 
was used across four community centres, the 
central library and the city museum in Sunderland. 
This engagement approach had the least direct 
input from researchers in terms of participant 
engagement but had considerable input from the 
researchers in the setup, observational work while 
the engagement was on-going and post 
engagement analysis.  
3. LESSONS LEARNED 
Lessons learned from developing the engagement 
programme can be grouped into three areas: 
control tension, situation and segmentation 
limitation. 
3.1 Control Tension 
When designing engagements, a tension emerged 
between the control the researcher needed to have 
over the engagement and the control that the 
researcher needed to cede to the participants. 
During the initial engagements such as the 
participatory video and think-out-loud technology 
evaluations, the need to give control to participants 
(Ospina et al, 2008) became clear.  This means that 
engagement cannot start from a fixed question, but 
that researchers have to interpret what is produced 
during the engagement. Researchers also learned 
that even light control might be too dominant for 
some groups of participants. Engagement with 
communities is often mediated through powerful 
stakeholders such as community and youth 
workers. Therefore, in terms of control, it is also 
important to understand the involvement and 
influence of stakeholders close to the end users. 
This is often unavoidable but, as French et al 
(2010) point out, such stakeholder influence needs 
to be acknowledged in any engagement activity as 
it will have an impact on how messages are 
received.   
 
The documentary video made by Hudsons Youth 
Project demonstrated too much control by 
researchers as researchers’ words were repeated 
back through the video suggesting that what was 
presented was what the young people believed the 
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researchers wanted to hear rather than what they 
actually felt.   
 
In order to cede control to participants, design 
researchers need to reduce the influence of 
researchers and gatekeepers as far as possible 
and select media for data collection that is culturally 
sympathetic to the target demographic. 
3.2 Situation 
Engagement fails when it assumes a transmission 
model of communication, ignores lay or public 
perceptions and when it presents technological fait 
d’accompli. The need to develop insight is 
emphasised by French et al (2011) and the key 
lesson to take away is that for engagement to be 
successful it is vital to understand end users and 
the contexts that determine their attitudes and 
behaviours from their point of view – not how the 
researcher imagines it to be. 
 
In the think-out-loud technology evaluation, the 
context of registering with an on-line Council 
service did not resonate with all the participants. 
Also, those evaluations were run in a community or 
UK online centre and this was not a physical space 
that all the participants would use for on-line 
registration. Another situational issue was the lack 
of family context. Many of the less digitally capable 
participants would typically register for on-line 
services with the help of family members. In this 
case, on-line engagement without other family 
members present as well as outside the home was 
not natural. As a result, fewer participants with this 
type of background took part in the think-out-loud 
technology evaluation and for those that did; their 
evaluation was stilted because of their lack of 
familiarity with the context.  
 
Therefore, design researchers need to recognise 
the importance of appropriately situating the 
engagement in as natural a setting as possible.  
This is often referred to as ‘ecological validity’ 
(Hayes, 2000, p.105) and is often absent in 
laboratory-based studies.   
3.3 Limitations of Segmentation 
As was seen with the participatory video, the 
manner in which an engagement is responded to 
depends on the segmentation of the participants. 
Also, there will be a range of responses within each 
segment. In particular, issues of digital literacy, 
degree of stability in home and social lives, 
cognitive capacity and degree of social confidence 
were some of the dominant factors in influencing 
segmentation response. It is therefore important 
that design researchers do not present the 
experiences of demographic segments as a 
homogeneous group with a single consistent 
attitude towards technology and risk. Otherwise the 
research stands to unknowingly alienate an often 
significant proportion of the user community.  More 
subtle approaches to segmentation are needed. It is 
also important for researchers to recognise that 
different research focuses need different types of 
segmentation. In the VOME project, we found that 
community-based segmentation had an important 
role to play (Andreason, 2006) and therefore 
segmentation according to family settings was 
important.  
4. CONCLUSION 
The push towards participant- controlled 
engagement was a valuable journey. As 
intervention designers, we were able to gather the 
views and inputs of a wider audience.  By not 
taking account of the lessons learned systems are 
likely to be designed that end users will resist using 
either because they don’t take sufficient account of 
existing attitudes and behaviours or because they 
do not accord with how systems are used in a real-
world setting. The lessons learned will influence the 
methodologies used in future studies around not 
just privacy awareness but online awareness and 
behaviour in general.   
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Risk-driven approaches are dominant in secure systems design; these aim to elicit and treat vulnerabilities
and the threats exploiting them. Such approaches, however, are so focused on driving risks out of system
design, they fail to recognise the usefulness of failure as a vehicle for security innovation. To explore the
role of failure as a design tool, we present the security premortem: a participative design technique where
participants assume that a system has been exploited, and plausible reasons are given for explaining why.
We describe this approach and illustrate how software tools can be used to support it.
Risk,Premortem,CAIRIS
1. INTRODUCTION
Many of the approaches associated with secure
system design are driven by the elicitation and
mitigation of risks. These are concerned with
identifying vulnerabilities which expose assets of
value, together with threats which exploit them. While
useful concepts for both design and information
security management, focusing too much on risks
may draw undue attention to the symptoms of
security failures, rather than their root causes. To
better understand these causes we must elevate
security failures to concepts worthy of analysis in
their own right.
Because there are many reasons for why a system
might be exploited, it has been argued that security
is what social planners call a wicked problem. This
is because we lack clarity about what it means
to secure systems, tests for proving a system is
secure, and a grasp of all possible solutions for
satisfying a specified security problem (Faily and
Fléchais 2010b). Therefore, while assurances may
be given that a system’s specification is secure,
we can never be certain that circumstances won’t
arise where these assurances fail to hold. What
specifying a design does do is force designers to
make value judgements about what might be a good
enough solution. Even if these judgements lead
to ineffective design decisions, knowledge about
failures still provide insights to designers about the
nature of the problem space.
It seems nonsensical that we might want to make
design decisions knowing that they are doomed
to fail, but doing so is also emancipatory. While
it is generally accepted that security is a weak
link problem in that attackers will find and exploit
this weak link, reflecting on the different ways a
chain might break can lead to insights that would
otherwise be missed if the weak link is allowed to
fail and then quickly replaced with another functional
— but still imperfect — link. The idea of thinking
about the potentially broken chain rather than its
weak link is analogous to the business scenario
planning metaphor of the premortem. These operate
on the assumption that a solution has failed and,
rather than reflecting on what might have gone
wrong, designers instead generate plausible reasons
for explaining the solution’s failure (Klein 2007).
Even when ambiguity shrouds the reason for this
failure, the lack of clarity provides clues about what
additional evidence is needed before the “cause of
death” can be established.
In this paper we present an approach for planning,
running, and evaluating the results of a security
premortem: a participative design technique where
participants assume that a system has been
exploited, and plausible reasons are given for
c© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
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explaining why. The objective of security premortems
is to identify the reasons for a failure, rather than
attempting to mitigate them. In Section 2, we present
our approach, before illustrating how the software
tools can support this technique, and integrate
its results into the broader secure system design
process in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, we reflect
on some of the consequences that might arise from
running and evaluating premortems.
2. APPROACH
Our approach for running security premortems is
loosely based on the three-step process proposed
by Klein (Klein 2007); this is described in more detail
in the following sections.
2.1. Presenting the scenario
In the first step the project team is brought together
and informed that the project has failed because of
security problems. Careful thought needs to be given
to the “breaking-news” scenario being presented; it
must be significant enough to cause the project’s
failure, believable enough for participants to take the
failure seriously, yet also imprecise enough to yield
several causes of failure. Based on an imaginary
software platform we shall call ACME, an example
of a possible scenario is described below:
A major news provider picked up a story based on
blog reports by angry mobile phone users; these
complain about increased email spam and phishing
mails since they started using ACME services. This
spam is sufficiently targeted that it evades spam
filters. These incidents led to irate twitter posts
appearing on the twitter feed on the ACME home
page, especially from developers who users blame
for this problem. As the bad press grew, major
partners began to leave the project, and funding was
cut. The cuts meant that the project was forced to
stop work.
2.2. Stating potential causes of death
In the second step, team members are given
time to independently write down every reason
they can think of for the failure; this includes
reasons they would normally consider inappropriate.
Following this, the facilitator asks each person in
turn for a reason, starting with the team leader or
most senior team member present. These reasons
may correspond to problems at different levels
of abstraction. For example, one possible reason
might be: Hardcoded administrator accounts and
secrets were, as a result of testing, committed in
a major release of ACME that is used in most
installations of ACME. This allowed attackers to
target cloud services hosting ACME services, and
leaking personal information to pastebin.
2.3. Incorporating reasons into the design
After each reason has been recorded, participants
review a hard-copy collection of project specification,
reports, and models. Where these artefacts corre-
spond with a possible reason, these are tagged by
affixing a “reason” post-it note to the appropriate
location in the physical document. Where an artefact
does not but should, ideally, exist, then these are
noted on a white-board or flip-chart and post-it notes
are attached. At the end of the workshop, the team
leader reviews the reasons; the tags are used to
determine how these reasons cross-cut the system
design. Based on this, an action plan is proposed for
addressing these reasons.
3. SUPPORTING TOOLS
We now illustrate how software tools can be re-
used or extended to support security premortems.
In particular, we consider the open-source CAIRIS
(Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and
Information Security): a Requirements Management
tool for supporting the elicitation and specification of
usable and secure systems. CAIRIS was developed
to implement the IRIS (Integrating Requirements and
Information Security) meta-model, which integrates
concepts from HCI, Requirements Engineering, and
Information Security (Faily and Fléchais 2010a).
CAIRIS was designed to be a research tool and can
be extended to support new design concepts and
techniques. A more detailed overview of CAIRIS is
beyond the scope of this paper, but more information
about its design and evolution can be found in (Faily
and Fléchais 2012).
3.1. Presenting the scenario
Software tools like CAIRIS can be used to support
the elicitation and specification of scenarios used
in premortem workshops. These scenarios might
be consequences of misusability cases: scenarios
which describe how design decisions cause usability
problems that might lead to system misuse (Faily
and Fléchais 2011). These scenarios are motivated
by argumentation models, the grounds of which
might be requirements or architectural components
which specify how the system should behave,
or behavioural characteristics of personas —
descriptions of archetypical user behaviour (Cooper
1999) — that use it. As such, these scenarios
describe contexts where a system which satisfies
the designers’ intentions might be unintentionally
exploited.
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Scenarios might also arise from specified misuse
cases; these describe the consequences of specified
risks being realised (Sindre and Opdahl 2005). For
example, (Atzeni et al. 2011) describes how, with
the aid of CAIRIS, open-source threat data from the
OWASP (The OWASP Foundation 2011) project was
used to create personas for attackers and elicit the
attacks they might employ.
3.2. Stating potential causes of death
The causes of failure naturally fit with the require-
ments engineering concept of domain properties;
descriptive statements about the problem world. In
the case of premortem scenarios derived from mis-
usability cases, CAIRIS can associate these reasons
with the both the scenarios and its argumentation
model. This is illustrated by the example in Figure
1, which forms the basis of the scenario presented
in Section 2.
3.3. Incorporating reasons into the design
To support the integration of premortem reasons into
the requirements and architectural design, we have
extended CAIRIS in two ways.
First, we have extended CAIRIS to support the
association of one or more tags with model concepts.
In addition to providing a means for interrogating
CAIRIS models based on these tags as a search
criteria, several of CAIRIS’ visual models have also
been updated to support the annotation of tags to
different model elements.
Second, if risks are not evident then these tagged
artefacts can be analysed in more detail. To
allow this, we have built qualitative data analysis
capabilities into CAIRIS. This allows us to assign
codes — words or phrases that assign a summative,
essence-capturing attribute for a portion of language
based data (Saldaña 2009) — directly to design
artefacts stored in CAIRIS. For example, based on
the reason we gave in Section 2.2, we might wish to
better understand the factors that might lead to this
reason; as Figure 2 shows, this might include coding
persona descriptions. Relationships drawn between
these thematic concepts might be used to motivate
vulnerabilities, in the same way that argumentation
models can motivate premortem scenarios.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an approach for applying
premortems for finding security failures in a secure
system design. We have also shown how CAIRIS
can support this technique by facilitating scenario
generation, categorising models according to failure
reason and, based on these reasons, analysing
model data to find ways of addressing their root
causes.
We are currently evaluating both this technique and
CAIRIS’ ability to support it as part of the webinos
project. As part of this evaluation, we are exploring
possible stimuli that might be used by participants
for eliciting reasons. These stimuli includes adopting
the perspective of an attacker with the aid of pre-
developed attacker personas. We are also evaluating
the physical settings where premortem processes
can be run. By running premortem workshops,
participants gain respect from their colleagues by
suggesting insightful reasons, and healthy team
dissent is encouraged rather than discouraged
(Klein 2009). However, workshops can be difficult
to set up when team members are distributed,
and a successful outcome is often dependent on
the effectiveness of the group’s facilitator. For this
reason, we are currently investigating how effective
the premortem process might be if reasons are
elicited on a one-to-one basis outside of a workshop,
and what sort of factors might lead to the elicitation
of insightful reasons given the change of setting.
By tool-supporting premortems, we also raise the
question of how far tools can go before they obstruct,
rather than stimulate, creativity and innovation? The
innovation design dilemma suggests that structure
might stymie creativity but, without it, creative output
might become too disruptive (Hobek 1988). In this
respect, we believe CAIRIS strikes a balance. By
providing only modest tool-support during workshop
settings, the tool provides little to obstruct group
dynamics. Also, by aligning reasons and their
rationale with CAIRIS models, the impact of security
innovation arising from premortem scenarios can be
explored.
If qualitative data analysis is to be used to find
the root causes of failure then CAIRIS will need
to be used more visibly in group settings; this will
help mediate discussions around qualitative models
stored within the tool. While techniques for using
software for supporting qualitative research are well
known, their use for supporting design, especially
for security, is ill-explored. Consequently, future work
will also explore the effectiveness of qualitative data
analysis techniques in conjunction with premortems
to more directly support secure system design
activities.
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Figure 1: Misusability case argumentation model motivating a security premortem
Figure 2: Coding a persona based on a premortem reason
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Cybercrime is often organized, and the actual individuals that are perpetrating the different parts of the attack
might not be aware of or interested in the overall organizational motives behind the attack. In this paper,
based on interviews with IT security experts, we build on the attacker persona methodology and extend it
with methodology to also handle organizational attacking motives in order to tackle organized cybercrime.
The resulting framework extends the attacker persona methodology by also using narratives in order to
assess the own organization’s security. These narratives give rise to intrigue sketches involving any number
of attacker personas which, hence, make it possible to take organized cybercrime into account.
Organized cybercrime, narrative, attacker persona, intrigue sketch
1. INTRODUCTION
From a user perspective, the problem of not being
able to effectively apply security mechanisms is
twofold: lack of usability in the security mechanism
itself (Zurko and Simon 1996; Zurko 2005) and lack
of user engagement due to not understanding the im-
plications of bypassing a security mechanism (Platt
2006). As an example, Whitten and Tygar (1999)
highlighted how users were unable to understand
the security mechanism (PGP 5.0) which eventually
lead to confidential data being sent in the clear.
Similarly, users are in most cases not well aware
about the consequences of their actions which can
lead to devastating results (Adams and Sasse 1999;
Fléchais and Sasse 2009).
Consequently, there is a need for a framework to
be used for enlightening the user/defender about the
attacker perspective (Brynielsson 2009), and enable
them to specify security-centric requirements in their
context of use. However, in order to do this one
must have some representation of the threats and
the actual actors who might pose the threat. Still,
such criminal actors are likely to be hard to find and
even harder to interview. In this paper we follow-up
on recent work (Atzeni et al. 2011) and propose a
solution based on the persona methodology.
2. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The elastic nature of the general and routine-like
use of the term user as identified by Cooper (2004)
is being acknowledged by many researchers and
forms the basis for the use of personas in systems
development. However, we argue that problems,
and explicitly security problems, can be as elastic,
especially in terms of assessing the organizational
security. As an example, consider a situation where a
user somehow downloaded a malicious file from the
Internet. This whole activity points towards multiple
factors which could have resulted in the download
of that file. Such factors typically represent in-
adequacies with regard to, e.g., the security policy,
the security mechanism, the user awareness, and
so forth. The security problem in itself is elastic and
depends not only on a single factor, but rather upon
multiple factors. In this paper, a narrative is taken to
be an indicator pointing towards such factors.
To further elaborate on the narrative property,
consider the known analogy of the elephant and
the six blind men. The blind men come across an
elephant; by feeling different parts of the elephant
each individual tries to describe what they perceive:
they will all describe the elephant in various,
and probably different, ways depending on if they
have encountered the tail, the ears, the legs,
the proboscis, or any other part of the elephant.
This situation highlights that any complex and
large problem being immediately perceived by an
individual may elicit many different descriptions. In
terms of an organization, the elephant represents the
security-critical issues/problems, e.g., the download
of a malicious file, and the blind men denote
the different stakeholders. The perceptions of
these stakeholders are the narratives, and each
stakeholder might be able to describe an event or
c© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
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activity using a number of narratives. The narrative
provides us with potential causes of an event, and
with multiple people providing their narratives it
becomes easier to identify overall security holes.
Of course, the most predominant cause of the
security issue will have an overlapping effect among
the collected narratives. This overlapping between
narratives will identify the major loop holes, and
the collection of narratives will incorporate factors
which one individual was unable to identify. Thus, the
collection of narratives encompasses multiple factors
and provides insight into the cause of the security
problem from different angles.
2.1. Organized cybercrime and personas
Recent trends in the IT security landscape suggest
that organized cybercrime has become part of the
everyday cyber landscape with criminal groups using
cybercrime to achieve their goals (McCusker 2006;
Choo and Smith 2008). Moreover, McCombie and
Pieprzyk (2010) suggest that there are cases where
groups of cybercriminals have used extortion, black-
mailing, and online fraud to achieve their desired
goal. To map such an organization into a persona
is a challenge due to the inadequacy of observable
data about organizational culture, environment, hier-
archical structure, communication, etc. Furthermore,
the persona methodology is designed towards con-
vergence of a group of individuals with more or less
similar motivations, goals, skills, behavior, etc., into
a single personification. To overcome these issues,
the persona methodology needs to be extended to
provide insight into such critical issues. However,
there has been work carried out to capture the
group or organizational aspect of persona (Giboin
2011; Judge et al. 2012; Matthews et al. 2011),
but personification of a group of attackers has its
limitation mainly due to the secret nature of such
organizations.
3. FRAMEWORK
In this section we present our framework, which is
an attempt to highlight the organizational security
threats while extending the persona methodology.
The framework comprises 1) narratives, 2) attacker
personas (including scenarios), 3) intrigue sketches,
and 4) plots. Narratives have already been discussed
while this section serves to describe attacker
personas, intrigue sketches and plots.
3.1. Attacker personas
Personas is a method for highlighting end users
and their needs of a system (Cooper 2004). Since
personas can be used to replace direct user
participation its usefulness has been questioned
by some people (Grudin 2006; Portigal 2008).
However, others argue that this is its actual strength
since actual user involvement in the design can
be perceived as a hinder due to idiosyncratic
demands of the real users (Cooper 2004; Grudin
2006). By representing the attackers as personas
we can get an understanding of the complex ways
attackers might work. This introduces problems
as we cannot interview actual attackers. Atzeni
et al. (2011) have dealt with this problem by
using assumptions of their character while collecting
data from sources such as attacker taxonomies,
profiling, and knowledge elicitation workshops.
However, Tariq et al. (2012) argue that the personas
should be context independent as security is not
a single context problem: in fact, each security
issue has multiple contexts, especially in terms of
organizations. De-attaching the context from the
attacker personas gives the flexibility to use attacker
personas in multiple contexts. That is, we do not
argue against a context bound framework but argue
against an attacker persona that is bound to specific
contexts or specific systems. Rather, we perceive
attacker personas as a collection of threats to an
organization.
Scenarios are part of the persona methodology and
are used to describe the sequential activities that
a user undertakes to reach a specific goal. We
have used the concept of scenarios, as discussed
by Quesenbery (2006), and applied it in terms
of attacker activities, i.e., we have developed a
set of small stories which emphasize how a
specific attacker in the past has attacked several
organizations to achieve their goal. However, these
stories do not provide a detailed step by step
approach to describe an attack, but rather provides a
high-level description of the attack. The aim of using
the scenarios is to provide a basic understanding
of how an actual attacker could operate and
which weaknesses that might be exploited by the
attacker. This information is particularly helpful while
analyzing the narratives and relating them with the
attacker personas. Hence, the idea of presenting
this information is to provide a guideline so that
the narrative can be related to the personas and
scenarios while developing intrigue sketches, which
will be discussed further in the following section.
3.2. Intrigue sketches
Before we define the intrigue sketch it is necessary
to understand why we need intrigue sketches.
As discussed in Section 3.1, our personas are
context independent so in order to put them in an
organizational context we need to relate them to
organizational-specific narratives. In practice, this
process consists of a systematic interpretation of
the narrative in terms of attacker personas. The
interpretation can mainly be carried out by someone
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who has a good understanding of IT security, and
thus the security analyst is part of the process. This
interpretation of a narrative in terms of personas
enables one to understand the problem identified
by the narrative from an IT security viewpoint.
Also, taking this attacker perspective could help
determining the overall motivations and goals behind
an attack, which might lead to identifying organized
cybercrime activity by looking at multiple intrigue
sketches, which will be discussed further below.
The intrigue sketches make use of narratives, secu-
rity analysts and attacker personas with scenarios.
Both the narrative and the attacker personas have
some attributes in common which are mainly goals,
motivations, and skills. The narrative incorporates
these aspects from the respondent perspective, e.g.,
how a certain event took place, which critical asset
was targeted, and so forth. Similarly, each persona
contains a set of goals, motivations, and skills. When
these attributes, derived from a narrative and the
corresponding attacker personas, are related with
each other by a security analyst/expert the result
is an intrigue sketch. The intrigue sketch holds in-
formation about the relevant attacker or attackers,
possible attack procedure (derived from the corre-
sponding attacker persona scenario), motivations,
and goals. The intrigue sketch development process
can be seen as a way to combine the attacker per-
spective (personas with scenarios), the respondent
perspective (narrative) and the security perspective
(the security analyst) in order to understanding the
multidimensional aspects of security. For the devel-
opment of the overall framework, it should also be
emphasized that each intrigue sketch will contain
at least one persona, but can of course contain
more depending on the narrative. To make sense
of the intrigue sketches in terms of the organiza-
tional perspective, each intrigue sketch should be
classified mainly on the basis of the attacker’s goals
and in some cases the combination of both goals
and motivations. This classification of the intrigue
sketches will prove necessary in the next phase of
the framework, which is the creation of plots.
3.3. Plots
The plot is the last part of the framework, which
describes the overall security of the organization
by relating intrigue sketches with the existing
security practices being used by the organization.
Each intrigue sketch can be related with the
existing security practices of the organization
either individually or collectively to point out
threats to the organization. However, using intrigue
sketches individually may result in ignoring the
multidimensional aspect of security. On the other
hand, however, there could be a case where the










































































Figure 1: The complete framework consists of different
narratives that are collected from the respondents in the
organization, which are then being related with attacker
personas with scenarios in order to develop intrigue
sketches, which are finally brought together with existing
organizational practices to develop the overall plot.
activities. In such case, the plot will comprise of a
single intrigue sketch related with the organizational
practices to identify potential threats. A collective
usage of the intrigue sketches will provide a holistic
view of the organizational security. To achieve this
it is critical that the intrigue sketches are specified
so that it is easy to identify the overlapping among
them. This problem is solved by the specification of
intrigue sketches in terms of goals and motivations,
as mentioned earlier. The intrigue sketches can be
related by using a combination of both goals and
motivations, e.g., attackers who are trying to steal
critical information and are ideologically motivated
can be clustered together, etc.
Once the intrigue sketches have been synthesized
they can be related to existing organizational
practices, which will result in an assessment of
the existing security practices of the organization
and eventually identify threats that the organization
might face. However, it should be mentioned that
the number of plots will depend upon the number
of intrigue sketch syntheses, i.e., the intrigue
sketches might result in one espionage synthesis
and one mafia synthesis which, when related with
the organizational practices, will yield two different
plots since they represent two separate kinds of
attacks. To finally tackle the organized cybercrime
threat, the attacker personas can be related from
an organized cybercrime perspective based on
their goals and motivations to find out whether
the attacker personas represent individual attackers
or are part of an organized criminal activity. To
summarize, see Figure 1 where the framework
constituents have been put in perspective to each
other.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a framework to be used for
understanding the IT security environment in an or-
ganization. The framework highlights possible incon-
sistency in terms of understanding the requirements
and expectations from an organizational perspective.
Also, the framework is an effort to assess the or-
ganizational security from multiple perspectives by
extending the persona methodology. We have pre-
sented attacker personas such that they are context
independent and are used to incorporate the orga-
nized cybercrime perspective. The major contribu-
tion is the intrigue sketch which is the combination of
a respondent’s narrative, generic attacker personas
and a security specialist’s assessment. The intrigue
sketch sets a scene for the possibility to frame one
or several attackers in a specific situation.
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User registration can have a serious impact on the success of online government services. 
Different services require different levels of identity assurance, and different registration 
processes are put in place to deliver them. But from the citizen’s perspective, these processes 
often require a disproportionate amount of effort, which reduces users’ acceptance. Typically, 
when sign-up to high-effort services is not mandatory, take-up is low; when it is compulsory, it 
causes resentment, and neither is desirable. Designers of services requiring registration currently 
have no way of assessing likely user acceptance at design time. We are introducing a tool that 
allows system designers to identify the impact of registration processes on different groups of 
users, in terms of workload and friction. Personas have been successfully applied to assist 
security designers, and we extend the concept with statistical properties, and introduce the 
Persona Group Calibration (PGC) exercise to calibrate the different personas for sensitivity to 
specific identity-related elements.  
Registration, E-services, Security friction, Workload, Design 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The registration process for any e-service can have 
a dramatic impact on the user’s lived experience. 
There is empirical evidence that cumbersome 
registration processes reduce the number of 
service users (egovbarriers.org 2007). Security 
measures adopted should not be a burden on 
users (OECD 2007). User behaviour is goal-driven 
– they sign up to an e-government service because 
they need to complete a task (Sasse & Flechais 
2005), and barriers to completing such tasks have 
a significant negative impact on the user’s lived 
experience (Inglesant & Sasse 2007). If registration 
processes for e-services are too cumbersome, 
citizens are discouraged in the earliest stages, and 
may never experience the potential benefits of 
transacting online.  To support designers of e-
services, we have developed a citizen-centric 
technique that allows us to capture the user’s 
sensitivity to registration process design elements 
and help us predict the expected workload and 
level of friction (chances that a user leaves the 
process) caused by new registration processes. 
The technique is based on an empirical exercise 
(Persona Group Calibration) to identify causes of 
friction within the registration process. This 
information is then used to predict expected 
reactions to new designs across different projects. 
In the Compliance Budget, Beautement, Sasse & 
Wonham (2008) define friction as the imbalance 
between the business process (user goals) and 
security behaviour required, including any inherent 
cognitive and physical workload. In our model, 
workload is measured as a separate factor since it 
was found that workload and friction are not always 
linearly related: registration pages with high 
workload values might still result in low friction, for 
instance when online access makes their lives 
easier (e.g. because it removes the need to travel 
to an office only open for certain hours). Thus we 
introduce the Type of Service (i.e. level of regular 
compulsion) to explain this phenomenon. 
2. THE METHOD 
The following section describes the method we 
have developed to capture user’s sensitivity to 
friction in e-service registration processes, followed 
by an outline of the process to apply this 
information in a prediction model to forecast friction 
(including workload). 
2.1 Setting the foundations 
In this section we will establish the set of design 
elements that have a negative impact on the user’s 
lived experience (causing a negative reaction, such 
as frustration and even service abandonment). We 
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conducted an empirical study to determine the 
main points that cause workload and frustration in 
e-service registration processes. Five design 
elements were identified. These are grounded in 
empirical data and discovered through the adoption 
of techniques borrowed from Grounded Theory: 
open and axial coding (Charmaz 2006). These 
design elements are summarized below: 
 Items to recall (ItR): Number of facts the user 
has to recall from memory (e.g.SSN) 
 Items to generate (IG): Number of new 
credentials required (e.g. username/password) 
 Delay (D): An indicator denoting whether the 
production task is delayed by a security task 
(e.g. waiting for an activation email – minor delay 
– or waiting for the provider to manually validate 
a registration form – major delay) 
 Interruption of routine (I): A flag indicating 
whether the user has to go out of his way to 
complete the task (e.g. visit a registration 
authority) 
 Perceived workload (W): The perceived level of 
cognitive and physical workload induced by the 
security tasks  
 
We also noted that these design elements are 
weighted differently depending on the regularity of 
compulsion for an e-service being discussed. For 
this purpose, we had to consider the Type of 
Service (ToS) as a behavioral modifier. The Type 
of Service can be defined as: the number of times 
users are legally obliged to use a service in any 
given year. These can be summed up in 4 levels: 
─ Level 1: No legal obligation to use the service 
─ Level 2: Legal obligation to use service at 
most a couple of times in a lifetime 
─ Level 3: Legal obligation to use service at 
most once per year 
─ Level 4: Legal obligation to use service 
multiple times per year 
At Levels 3 and 4 penalties apply when citizens do 
not comply with set regulations (e.g. deadlines), 
while benefits exist for compliance. For Levels 2, 3 
and 4 citizens can alternatively send forms by post. 
2.2 Persona Group Calibration (PGC) 
Adhering to citizen-centric design principles we 
developed personas following Cooper’s 
recommendations and through successive 
refinements, starting from a plausible 
approximation of our user, supplementing it with 
experience, interviewing and secondary data, we 
move towards a fictitious user archetype having 
specific characteristics, needs and goals (Cooper 
2004). To predict the expected reactions of 
different personas towards specific design 
elements in registration processes, we first need to 
understand how persona representatives behave 
when facing different tasks. These representatives 
participate in a Persona Group Calibration (PGC) 
exercise which in turn provides us with a set of 
behavioural parameters. Representatives of a 
persona under investigation may obtain similar 
results to representatives of another persona. In 
this case, these two personas can then be grouped 
under a single persona group. A persona group 
encompasses one or more personas that share a 
common factor: behaviour when facing different 
design elements in registration processes.  
We needed to set the assessment in the context of 
a set of pre-defined registration tasks; to identify 
these, we surveyed the registration processes on a 
number of e-government portals, and for each 
eService identified, we measured design elements 
defined in Section 2.1, except for workload. 
Perceived workload is user-specific, and can only 
be measured during calibration. From this exercise 
the most common registration page setups used in 
e-services were generalized into nine different 
fictitious registration processes. The registration 
processes cover as many configurations as 
possible in order to capture the widest range of 
data from test participants. Extreme configurations 
are also present within the set of nine processes 
(e.g. from a simple email/password registration 
process and up to lengthy and laborious processes 
which also require physical travelling).  
Based on the pre-defined tasks, we built a 
mechanism that helps us capture user behaviour, 
providing us with enough data to be able to predict 
friction on different configurations of design 
elements. We created a fictitious government portal 
offering 9 e-services with different registration 
processes. PGC participants were asked to go 
through each registration process. After each task, 
the participant was asked to rate 6 workload scales 
assessing the different dimensions as specified in 
NASA-TLX (Mental Demand, Physical Demand, 
Temporal Demand, Performance, Effort and 
Frustration). Following the 9 tasks, the participant 
was asked to give a weighting for each of the six 
scales by completing a pair-wise comparison 
exercise. For a full discussion on NASA-TLX, the 
reader is directed to Hart & Staveland (1988). After 
each of the nine registration tasks, the participant is 
also required to state whether he/she would 
consider completing the process (given the current 
registration process configuration), and such 
decision needs to be taken in four situations, one 
for each level defined in the Type of Service design 
element. To rate friction, participants are asked the 
following question: “Given this registration process, 
would you consider registering for this service?” 
Four 10-point Likert scales ranging from 0 to 1 (with 
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increments of 0.1) are presented, one for each of 
the four Type of Service levels.  
 
After completing the 9 tasks, the participant’s data 
collected was transferred to a spreadsheet for 
further processing. Each sheet contains 9 rows, 
(one for each task) whereby each row holds the 
task ID, rating for each NASA-TLX workload scale, 
a computed overall weighted workload measure for 
each task, and friction for the four type of service 
levels. Once the participants from a specific 
persona group complete the PGC exercise, all of 
their data is merged and prepared for further 
processing. To be able to predict friction and 
workload we first need to fit two regression models 
on our data: a) Linear Regression Model for 
workload and b) Binary Logistic Regression Model 
for friction. After fitting these two models on the 
data (using a statistical package), we are provided 
with a y intercept (b0) together with a set of 
regression coefficients, one for each design 
element, explaining the model’s fit on our data. 
These coefficients can be defined as a persona 
group’s behavioural properties with regards to the 
different design elements present in registration 
processes (see Section 2.1).  These coefficients 
are then associated with the persona group under 
investigation. We found that certain design 
elements (predictors) are not statistically significant 
in the prediction of workload and friction. For this 
purpose and following proper model fitting 
techniques and statistical tests, only the most 
significant elements are used for both friction and 
workload models. Friction was best explained by 
IG, D, I and Type of Service, while Workload was 
best explained by ItR, D and I. This process allows 
us to capture a specific persona group’s sensitivity 
to different design elements (using regression 
coefficients). We now apply these insights to elicit 
the level of friction and workload in new (or 
existing) registration processes. For this purpose 
one final step is required. For a specific registration 
process, we need to determine the values for each 
of the design elements defined in section 2.1. 
These are the required predictors, which together 
with the regression coefficients determined in the 
previous step, would allow us to generate friction 
and workload values. The regression coefficients, y 
intercepts and predictor values are then 
parameterized into the following two equations: 
                                  
 
The first equation is the linear regression model, 
where Y is the outcome variable (predicted 
worklaod).  
 
 ( )  
 
    (                            )
 
 
The second equation is a binary logistic regression 
model, where P(Y) is the probability that a person 
completes the registration process, where 1-P(Y) is 
defined as the probability that a person abandons 
the registration process. 
 
In both cases, b0 is the y intercept for the model 
while bn is the coefficient for the corresponding 
predictor Xn (design element value). These 
coefficients will vary across different persona 
groups based on the output from the PGC exercise. 
After calculating Y and P(Y), we obtain a grounded 
idea of how a particular persona group reacts to a 
given design. Given the designers objectives (e.g. 
friction < 10%) an iterative process commences 
whereby the registration process is revisited, 
modified and re-assessed as part of a larger 
business process. This helps designers achieve a 
balance between the level of identity-assurance 
required (security goals) and the friction caused on 
the business process from the perspective of 
different user groups.  
3. CASE TOOL 
The method described in Section 2 is laborious, 
therefore we developed a decision support system 
to assist decision makers in the iterative 
assessment of design alternatives. Persona groups 
are stored in a persona library, making them 
available for re-use in different projects. This 
collaborative web-portal was developed using 
ASP.Net MVC 3. SPSS is used to generate the 
statistical parameters after each PGC exercise. 
 
4. CASE STUDY 
Formative evaluation of the method and 
corresponding tool was carried out through a real-
world case study. A collaborative agreement was 
set up with a government agency in Malta 
(Employment and Training Corporation - ETC). 
4.1 Objectives 
ETC’s management wanted to create an e-service 
to be used by the majority of human resource 
managers on the island. This requires a registration 
process that is acceptable by, and that does not 
add considerable burdens on users.  
4.2 Method 
We considered the HR Manager persona group for 
this study, and a number of representatives from 
several leading IT firms were contacted to 
participate in the first PGC exercise. Data was 
collected and prepared for processing. The two 
regression models were applied and the respective 
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sets of coefficients (and y intercepts) were 
generated and assigned to the persona group 
under investigation. This allowed us to analyse the 
impact that the registration process might have on 
this persona group. The registration process 
required users to visit a registration authority in 
person and after verifying their identity, a PIN 
would be sent by post. Once received, a new 
password is requested in order to activate the 
account. This can be annotated as follows: 




IG 2 Password and PIN 
ItR 2 ID No., and email address 
D Major Wait for PIN by post 
I True Visti a registration authority  
ToS 3  
4.2 Results 
The predictors (design element measurements) 
were parameterized into the regression equations, 
together with the respective y intercepts and 
regression coefficients, and values for friction and 
workload were obtained. Projected friction given 
the registration process and type of service under 
consideration was of 44% (i.e. 1-P(Y) == (1-
0.557)*100)) with a workload of 71%. This meant 
that almost half of the potential users would have 
abandoned the registration process and opted for 
alternative means. This has led management to 
reconsider their original plans and revert to 
alternative registration processes. One option was 
to offset the physical workload by requesting 
additional information, verifying such data manually 
while eliminating the need to visit a registration 
authority. A new registration process was devised 
with the following measurements:  




IG 2 Password and PIN 
ItR 17 More identifying info required 
D Major Manual verification by ETC staff 
I False No interruptions on daily routines 
ToS 3  
This resulted in improved values with friction at just 
over 10% - however, workload increased to 75%. In 
situations where the Type of Service is high people 
are ready to accept higher levels of workload in 
order to gain access to this kind of service (making 
their lives easier for future interactions), hence the 
low level of friction.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Beautement, Sasse & Wonham (2008) presented 
the Compliance Budget paradigm which denotes 
that compliance issues are mainly caused by 
friction between the required security behaviour 
and the user’s goals. Our work helps to 
quantitatively approximate the point at which users 
decide not to comply with the required security in 
registration pages. We plan to adopt and extend 
Faily & Fléchais’ Persona Cases (Faily & Fléchais 
2011). These personas, grounded in empirical 
data, would be associated with persona groups 
adding behavioural knowledge to such, which 
knowledge is in turn used to predict friction and 
inherent workload. Giving a ‘voice’ to personas 
through predictive statistical parameters, allows 
designers to make informed design decisions 
based on measurable and comparable values. 
Larger PGC exercises (with more participants) will 
result in more fine-tuned predictions however a 
statistical saturation point exists. The first case 
study gives a clear indication that the mechanics of 
the method (and corresponding tool) yield useful 
information. The captured knowledge on persona 
groups under investigation can be reused across 
different projects. We are confident that this 
method, and associated tool, will help designers 
garner further insights on their users which would in 
turn improve design decisions. 
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Current warnings during daily Web browsing demonstrate how difficult it is for developers to craft precise
and comprehensible security interventions. While researchers have found that personal contextualization of
interventions help in security-critical applications, taking this approach leads to an overwhelming range of
options of how and when to intervene as well as which factors to consider. To make contextualized security
interventions feasible, we need to support developers in selecting the relevant factors for their applications
and support them in deriving the appropriate intervention strategy and content. In this paper, we propose a
security intervention framework and methodology which provides such a support.
Security intervention, security communication, usability engineering
1. INTRODUCTION
Warnings of self-signed certificates in Web browsing
are an example of how difficult it is to craft
precise and comprehensible security interventions2.
These warnings occur independently from the user’s
intention like browsing for information (a low risk)
or transferring money (a high risk). This imprecision
results in habituation that might cause users to
ignore warnings in critical situations, since they have
ignored them several times without any negative
consequences. The problem here lies in the precision
of this particular security intervention: The warning
about the security of the connection should ideally
only occur if there is a risk for the user from continuing
to use the Web service as intended. Moreover, the
warning is formulated in a technical language that
is not comprehensible by the user: The inadequate
content of the intervention prevents the user from
understanding the risks of continuing to the Web site.
Several studies have shown that common Web
browsing warnings (certificate warnings, Sunshine
et al. (2009)) as well as other security indicators
(passive indicators, Whalen and Inkpen (2005)) are
1The work presented in this paper is supported by funds of the
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection
(BMELV) based on a decision of the Parliament of the Federal
Republic of Germany via the Federal Office for Agriculture and
Food (BLE) under the innovation support programme.
2We consider security interventions as signals to humans that
influence security-relevant decisions, e.g. a green location bar
(positive intervention) or warnings (negative intervention).
not effective. The ineffectiveness is caused by the
traditional approaches on security interventions that
take the form of generic hazard warnings: warn
a broad audience with static texts and symbols
(Wogalter 2006). Accordingly, researchers propose
to personalize and contextualize security indicators
(De Keukelaere et al. 2009). The idea is to employ
additional information on the context (e.g. user
intention) and the user (e.g. expertise) so as to make
better decisions on when to warn, how, and with what
content.
However, this is challenging for developers of
security-critical applications, because they need to
take into consideration both the contextual factors
and user characteristics in order to implement the
correct intervention strategy (whether, when, and
how to intervene) and intervention content (what
content to convey). Developers need to evaluate
available contextual factors, particularly for their
availability and impact. They also have to combine
the factors and balance whether the risks justifies
a blocking warning or whether the negative effects
(habituation, annoyance) are too high (cf. Böhme
and Grossklags 2011). De Keukelaere et al. (2009)
proposed an architecture for contextualized warnings
that evaluates factors so as to decide which type of
warning to display, but did not provide a methodology
to select the relevant factors. Moreover, the content of
the intervention should relate to the user to make the
warning more convincing – for example, by taking the
mental model into account (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011).
© The Authors. Published by BISL. 1
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Figure 1: Intervention framework with influences of the factors on intervention strategy and content
One part of this challenge is to assess which threats
and consequences are present in the actual situation,
and whether to emphasize the technical threat (e.g.
man-in-the-middle attack) or potential consequences
(e.g. financial losses).
Developers need to combine different kinds of inter-
ventions (e.g. passive symbols, active warnings) for
optimal results so that developers need broader sup-
port that considers a range of intervention options.
However, prior research on interventions primarily
focused on individual (types of) interventions. The
broad Human-In-The-Loop framework (Cranor 2008)
shows many factors that influence the effectiveness
of security interventions, but remains on a descriptive
level of theory: The framework only describes the
factors, but does not guide the developers on how
to arrive at an intervention.
To better support developers in future, we propose an
intervention framework that relates the intervention
strategy and content to the context and human
factors of a corresponding situation as well as
knowledge bases of human behavior and threats (cf.
Figure 1). We further present a methodology to derive
the relevant factors and knowledge bases, which
employs user studies, literature reviews, and expert
consultations. While applicable in various domains,
we focus on Web browsing as one important
application area when giving examples in this paper.
2. PRIOR RESEARCH ON SECURITY
INTERVENTIONS
Among the areas that security-intervention re-
searchers have focused upon is that of intervention
strategies, that is, when and in which form to in-
tervene. For example, Whalen and Inkpen (2005)
showed how symbols as a passive form of interven-
tions are seen, but not interacted with by the users.
Wu et al. (2006) argued that the right timing is im-
portant for interventions. Generally, active warnings
have been shown to be more effective than passive
indicators (Schechter et al. 2007). However, overly
frequent warnings (e.g. from false positives) lead to
habituation effects (Amer and Maris 2006).
Further research occurred on the content of
interventions. Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) showed
empirically that warnings are not understood –
for example, due to technical terminology. Biddle
et al. (2009) found that their reformulated warnings
made users more responsive to different levels
of connection security. Wogalter (2006) argues
that warnings need to inform about or remind
of the threats and consequences. Downs et al.
(2006) showed that phishing warnings are more
often ignored if the threats and consequences are
unknown. Furthermore, Kauer et al. (2012) found that
individuals are more likely to heed warnings if they
perceive personal consequences.
Wogalter (2006) also argues that warnings need to
fit the audience and that personal characteristics
should be taken into account when designing security
indicators. Lin et al. (2011), for example, found
that domain highlighting helps a subset of their
study participants, depending on the participants’
expertise. Bravo-Lillo et al. (2011) apply the Human-
in-the-Loop framework (Cranor 2008) to warnings
to describe the various factors that influence the
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Indicator Scope Measurement
Trustworthiness of operator Web site Recommendations
Connection encryption Connection Browser
User expertise User Questionnaire
Table 1: Examples of context indicators in Web browsing
behavior of the user – for example, they show that
behavior depends on expertise and prior experience.
To warn in an adequate form and achieve the
necessary impact, De Keukelaere et al. (2009)
proposed to adapt the intervention to the context ;
they found improvements from considering the
security risk and prior actions of the user.
3. SECURITY INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK
The goal of the framework is to support the
development of suitable security interventions. The
literature in the previous section points to the primary
concepts of the framework, depicted with their most
important interrelations in Figure 1. The outcome for
the developer is whether, when, and in which form
the intervention appears (intervention strategy, e.g.
active as a warning or passive as a symbol), and what
content it conveys (e.g. technical threats or personal
consequences).
Both the appearance and the content of the
intervention is in our framework primarily influenced
by the context and personal characteristics of the
user. Context indicators measure the security and
further aspects of the context, and vary concerning
scope and type of measurement (see Table 1 for
examples from Web browsing).
The information about the context needs to be in-
terpreted and modulated according to two knowl-
edge bases. The first concerns human behavior,
particularly the trust decisions – e.g. under which
circumstances users will trust a Web site enough to
enter a password (green location bar, professional
design, user expertise). Combining the information
from the context (e.g. whether the location bar is
green) and the knowledge on trust decisions will allow
us to estimate the behavior of the current user and to
what degree the user needs to be influenced through
an intervention. Herein, we take the existing trust
signals (e.g. green location bar) as the base line.
As the second knowledge base, the structure of
relevant threats and consequences enables a more
effective formulation of the content of the intervention.
By interrelating context indicators, threats, and
consequences, the specific consequences relevant
to the situation can be identified. In combination with
the knowledge on trust decisions, those threats and


























Figure 2: Intervention-factor elicitation methodology
most effective for the user (e.g. those with highest
personal value or those unaware of), depending on
her experience and expertise.
4. ELICITATION OF INTERVENTION FACTORS
To operationalize the framework, developers need
to elicit the intervention factors and build the
knowledge bases for their application area (e.g. Web
browsing). We propose the methodology depicted
in Figure 2, which employs expert consultations,
literature reviews, and user studies to elicit the factors
(context indicators, factors in human behavior, and
threats and consequences). Context indicators are
then evaluated for their availability (e.g. how can we
elicit the user’s Web browsing intention). Human-
behavior factors and threats and consequences are
evaluated for their influence on the intervention.
These sources are also used to interrelate context
indicators and factors to derive graphs for the
decisions on the intervention strategy and the
dynamic construction of intervention content: How
threats may lead to specific consequences, and
how context indicators signal specific behavior and
threats. Lastly, a gap analysis is performed based
on the graphs (e.g. for missing context indicators to
identify specific threats) and may trigger an additional
iteration.
Not all of these activities will be necessary in their en-
tirety for each newly developed intervention. We fore-
see general and domain-specific knowledge bases,
which, for example, are provided by researchers and
which developers then tailor to the specific applica-
tion.
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5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We collected first experiences on applying the
methodology in two application areas: Contextualized
warnings for Web browsing, which, amongst other
aspects, consider the intentions of the user; and
for email communication, e.g. addressing malicious
email content (phishing) and attachments. In both
cases, we conducted literature reviews for human
behavior (to identify how indicators influence users),
context indicators (what indicators exist and how they
can be measured), and threats (which threats and
consequences exist in the application). In addition,
we applied expert consultations for threat analysis
(how are the various threats and consequences
interrelated and how do they relate to context
indicators) and user studies (how can we elicit
the intentions of users in Web browsing as a
context indicator). By applying the methodology, we
could already derive promising dynamic warnings for
concrete situations.
The primary goal for future work is to evaluate the
practical applicability of the methodology on two
levels: regarding the resulting intervention (efficiency
and effectiveness of the intervention for the users)
and regarding the development process for the
developer. Since the evaluation of generative theories
is generally challenging (experimental settings are
difficult), we will analytically evaluate the developer
effort as the first step and conduct user studies
on the resulting interventions. The evaluation will
also include the level of complexity of the factors
that is necessary to arrive at superior interventions.
Lastly, we will study in which ways we can generalize
knowledge bases and algorithms that build upon the
framework to derive interventions.
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